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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HAL COMPANY, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
CaseNo.20050226-CA
vs.
MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS and
JEFF BREWER,
Defendants-Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
This case is within the statutory jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals
transferred from the Utah Supreme Court. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). The Utah
Supreme Court had jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (2002).
The Judgment and Decree was entered February 1,2005. (Record 152.) Defendants
filed their notice of appeal 31 days later, on March 4, 2005. (Record 158.) Defendants
sought an extension of time to validate the notice of appeal, claiming counsel had misread
the date of the Notice of Entry of Judgment as being the date the actual judgment was
entered. (Record 156.) Plaintiff opposed the extension on the ground that Serrato v. Utah
Transit Authority, 2000 UT App 299, If 8,13 P.3d 616, cert, denied, 21 P.3d 218, specifically

1

rejected such an excuse. (Record 173.) The trial court granted the requested extension.
(Record 183,180.)
WITHDRAWAL OF CROSS-APPEAL
Plaintiff filed a cross-appeal challenging the portion of the trial court's ruling that
determined plaintiff breached the lease by removing a marquee sign. (Record 175.) Because
no transcript was prepared,l however, plaintiff is not able to pursue that cross-appeal and
hereby withdraws it.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

May an appellant seek reversal based on supposed procedural errors where the

appellant does not show that the ultimate decision was wrong? This issue involves the
authority and practice of this Court; therefore, no standard of review applies.
2.

Does a trial judge have authority to reconsider and modify a decision prior to

entry of a final judgment? This is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Trembly v.
Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
3.

Where a case is transferred to a different judge of the same level of court, does

the new judge have authority to reconsider and modify decisions of the prior judge? This is
a question of law reviewed for correctness. Id.

defendants requested a transcript (Record 181), but no transcript was prepared.
Plaintiff did not independently order a transcript because defendants had done so. Plaintiffs
counsel has been informed by the court reporter's office that defendants failed notwithstanding several reminders to pay the required deposit for preparation of the transcript, and the
reporter therefore treated the request has having been withdrawn.
2

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Rule 54(a & b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure state:
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes
a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment
need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or
the record of prior proceedings. Judgments shall state whether
they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's
initiative; and, unless otherwise directed by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more
but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other
form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all
the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims
or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating
all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in pertinent part:
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial
may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of
the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however,
that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury,
the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry
of a new judgment:

3

(b) Time for Motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served
not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; Time for Filing....
(d) On Initiative of Court. Not later than 10 days after entry of
judgment the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for
any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion
of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter or
amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after
entry of the judgment.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a final judgment in a civil action.

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

The issues raised by defendants concern the course of proceedings below, so plaintiff
will describe the proceedings in more detail than might otherwise be typical.
The case was tried to Judge Steven L. Hansen on January 22,2004. At the conclusion
of the trial Judge Hansen announced judgment in favor of plaintiff, but denied plaintiffs
request for attorney fees. Judge Hansen instructed defendants' counsel to prepare a judgment
and order.2 (Record 42-41.3) On February 9, 2004, which was prior to defendants having
2

Rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that findings and orders
prepared by counsel be submitted within 15 days after the decision.
3

The documents in the trial court record are organized in reverse chronological order,
with the result that the numbering placed on the documents pursuant to Rule 11(b) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure runs in reverse order on each document.
4

submitted findings or a judgment, plaintiff filed a motion and supporting memorandum
arguing that the decision announced at the conclusion of trial was incorrect, and requesting
that the court modify the decision and enter judgment as requested by plaintiff.4 (Record 4645, 53-47.)
Judge Hansen held a hearing on plaintiffs motion on April 7, 2004. At the hearing
Judge Hansen inquired why defendants had not submitted findings of fact and conclusions
of law as ordered by the court, and directed defendants to do so. (Record 72.) Judge Hansen
indicated he was now leaning toward plaintiff position, but stated he wanted to review
defendants' proposals before ruling. (Record 79.5)
The case was transferred to Judge Samuel D. McVey on April 16,2004. (Record 89.)
On May 24, 2004, Judge Hansen signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
submitted by defendants (Record 77-73), but did not issue any minute entry giving notice that
he had done so nor any ruling explaining why he had chosen defendants' proposal. The court
computer docket showed that a judgment had been entered (Record 89), but the only
document actually entered was the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The parties did
4

The motion sought judgment "in accordance with the proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and the proposed Judgment and Decree, both of which are submitted
herewith." (Record 46.) Although it is evident from defendants' response that proposed
findings and judgment were submitted (Record 63), they do not appear in the court file.
5

No transcript of the hearing was prepared. Plaintiffs counsel asserted in a later
document that "the Court indicated that he was leaning in favor of the plaintiff but gave
defendants permission to submit their own proposals. (Record 79 f 6.) Defendants' response
did not dispute this statement. (Record 101-96, especially page 98 under the heading
"Judgment Submitted Herewith.")
5

not discover until August 2004 that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law had been
signed. (Record 86, 791f 8.)
Upon learning of the erroneous docket entry, plaintiff filed a Motion to Correct
Docket. (Record 82) Plaintiff also filed a motion to vacate the findings and conclusions,
asserting they were apparently entered by mistake. (Record 80-78.) Defendants acknowledged the docket entry was incorrect, and submitted a proposed judgment "to correct any
mistake." (Record 98.6) Plaintiff objected to the form of the proposed judgment. (Record
103-102.)
Judge McVey held oral arguments on the pending motions on December 10, 2004.
(Record 124.) He issued his Decision on Post-Trial Motions on December 21, 2004,
correcting Judge Hansen's earlier conclusion which denied attorney fees but declining to
modify the findings entered by Judge Hansen. (Record 146.) Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (Record 151-147) and a Judgment and Decree (Record 152) in
accordance with Judge McVey's ruling were entered February 1, 2005.
Defendants thereafter filed their notice of appeal. (Record 158.) Plaintiff filed a
notice of cross-appeal (Record 175-174), but now elects to not pursue that cross-appeal.
C.

Statement of Facts. Defendant Multi Media Musketeers entered into a lease

agreement with plaintiff on February 1,1996, regarding property known as Highland Plaza.
(Record 150 % 4.) Jeff Brewer guaranteed the lease agreement. (Record 150 U 5.) The lease

6

The proposed judgment does not appear in the court file.
6

agreement terminated by its terms on February 1, 1997, but Multi Media Musketeers
remained as a holdover tenant until October 10, 2002. (Record 150fflf6, 15.)
At some point during the lease, an exterior sign was placed on the marquee in front
of the office complex giving notice that it was the business location of Multi Media
Musketeers. (Record 150 ^ 9.) Plaintiff removed the sign in the spring of 2002. (Record
150 U 10.) The trial court found the removal was a breach of the month-to-month tenancy
and a constructive eviction of defendants. (Record 150-149 f 10.)
Plaintiff served a notice to pay rent or vacate the premises on defendants on or about
August 7, 2002. (Exhibit 16.) Defendants did not vacate the premises until October 10,
2002, but Judge Hansen found the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the lost rent because
of plaintiffs removal of the sign. (Record 146-145.) The carpet was stained when
defendants vacated the premises, and Judge Hansen awarded plaintiff the cost of replacement
of $1,563.43. (Record 149 f 11.) Defendants had previously paid a security deposit of
$525.00, which was allowed as a credit against the damages. (Record 149 If 12.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendants have argued there were procedural problems with the trial court's ruling,
but have not argued that the ultimate ruling was incorrect. Because defendants can show no
prejudice, any error was harmless and not grounds for reversal.

7

There were, however, no procedural or other errors in the actions taken to correct the
initial decision of Judge Hansen. The findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by
Judge Hansen did not constitute a judgment, so Judge Hansen was free to reconsider the prior
rulings. The successor judge to the same judicial office as Judge Hansen similarly had
authority to reconsider and correct the prior rulings in the case.
Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees below based on the contract, and is entitled to its
attorney fees on appeal.

ARGUMENT

I.

DEFENDANTS' CLAIMS ON APPEAL ARE BARRED BY
THEIR FAILURE TO SHOW THAT ANY ERROR WAS
PREJUDICIAL.

Notably absent from defendants' brief is any claim that the ultimate decision reached
by the trial court was somehow incorrect. Defendants do not, for example, offer any
authorities or argument showing that Judge McVey was wrong in concluding that plaintiff
was entitled to an award of attorney fees. Defendants offer no authorities or argument
challenging Judge McVey's decision to treble the damages in this unlawful detainer action.
Defendants do not claim on appeal that Judge Hansen's decision was legally correct and
Judge McVey's decision was wrong, only that there was some procedural impropriety in the
process by which the decision was corrected at the trial court level.

8

The following points of this brief establish there was no procedural error. Even if
there were some procedural misstep, however, it would not be grounds for reversal because
there was no prejudice to defendants. The ultimate decision was correct. "We do not reverse
the trial court for committing harmless error." Hall v. NACMIntermountain, Inc., 1999 UT
97, If 21,988 P.2d 942,947. Because defendants have not claimed that the ultimate decision
was wrong, their claims of procedural impropriety should be rejected.
It would, of course, be improper for defendants to attempt to argue in a reply brief that
the trial court's ruling was incorrect. This Court will "will not consider matters raised for
the first time in the reply brief." State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, % 19, 122 P.3d 566, 571.

II.

UNTIL THE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED, THE TRIAL
COURT HAD AUTHORITY TO RECONSIDER AND CORRECT
ITS DECISION.

Defendants urge this Court to "apply the time limit to this matter set forth in Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 59," and argue that plaintiffs motion to vacate the judgment should
have been served within ten days after entry of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
entered May 24,2004. (Appellants' brief p. 12.) By its terms, however, the time deadlines
of Rule 59 do not apply. Rule 59(b) states: "A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment." Rule 59(e) states: "A motion to alter or amend
the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." A motion
filed prior to the entry ofjudgment, therefore, is not governed by Rule 59. Ron Shepherd Ins.
Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653-654 (Utah 1994) ("Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration
9

of Judge Lewis's bench ruling was therefore not properly brought under that rule [Rule 59]
since no signed order or judgment was ever entered as a consequence of that ruling.").
No judgment was entered May 24, only findings and conclusions. "A judgment is also
distinct from the findings of a court, even though such findings are incorporated in the same
instrument with the judgment. This rule has been applied, not only to findings of fact, but
also to conclusions of law stated by the judge, whether made during or after the trial of the
case." 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 5 (1994).
Rule 54(a) defines "judgment" as including "a decree and any order from which an
appeal lies." In this case, no judgment was entered May 24, 2004. 7 The findings entered
May 24 did not purport to be a judgment, but state in the final paragraph of the conclusions:
"Judgment to enter in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $1038.45." This contemplates that
an additional document would enter, not that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
were the judgment. Because the findings and conclusions contemplated additional action,
that document was not an appealable judgment. State v. Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2, % 9, 65
P.3d 1180, 1182-83. In that case the trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and two months later signed an order of dismissal. The Utah Supreme Court held the
signed findings and conclusions were not a final judgment.

7

Defendants did not oppose plaintiffs motion to correct the docket, and the computer
docket has now been corrected to remove the notation concerning a judgment on May 24,
2004.
10

Reintsma v. Lawson, 727 P.2d 1323,1326 (Mont. 1986), involved an almost identical
situation to the instant case. The judge entered findings and conclusions, but no judgment.
The clerk mistakenly entered the findings in the court's judgment docket. The judge later
entered a judgment that was significantly different from the findings and conclusions, and
the defendant complained on appeal about the change in position. The Montana Supreme
Court rejected that claim, confirming that findings and conclusions do not constitute a
judgment.
Because no judgment was entered May 24,2004, the time deadlines of Rule 59 do not
apply. This Court should hold that plaintiffs motions with respect to the May 24 findings
and conclusions were timely.

III.

A NEW JUDGE ASSIGNED TO THE CASE HAD THE SAME
AUTHORITY TO RECONSIDER AND MODIFY DECISIONS
AS DID THE ORIGINAL JUDGE.

Defendants argue that Judge McVey improperly acted as an appellate judge over the
decision of Judge Hansen. (Appellants'brief p. 13.) Defendants assert they "can find no
authority which would allow a judge of the district court to examine the evidence taken by
another judge, and to draw a differing legal conclusion." (Appellants' brief 15.)
Contrary to defendants' argument, at least two Utah appellate decisions squarely hold
that where another judge rotates onto a case, the successor judge has the same authority as
the first judge to reconsider any ruling in the case. Interlake Distributors, Inc. v. Old Mill
Towne, 954 P.2d 1295,1299 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d
11

1306, 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Both cases cited Judge Orme's concurring opinion in
Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431,439-40 (Utah 1993) (Orme, J., concurring). The Trembly
court summarized the law as follows:
A single judge is entitled to correct any interim order previously
made, and even though a location within a judicial district is on
a rotating judge calendar, the authority of the judge who actually
decides the case on the merits to correct a previously entered
order is undiminished. On a rotating calendar, "[i]n a sense, the
two judges, while different persons, constitute a single judicial
office for law of the case purposes." Gillmor v. Wright, 850
P.2d 431, 439-40 (Utah 1993) (Orme, J., concurring).
884P.2datl311n.4.
Because Judge McVey was legally the same judicial officer as Judge Hansen, Judge
McVey did not act as an appellate judge over Judge Hansen's decision; rather, Judg&McVey
acted as if he was reconsidering his own decision. It was proper for Judge McVey to
reconsider and correct the decision.

IV.

PLAINTIFF PROPERLY REQUESTED THE TRIAL COURT
TO CORRECT ITS OWN ERRORS.

Defendants assert that there were "gross irregularities" that gave plaintiff "repeated
chances . . . to re-litigate a matter that had been decided multiple times." (Defendants' brief
p. 9.) While the post-trial history of this case did not follow the typical path, and while the
judgment ultimately entered was different than the one announced at the conclusion of trial,
there was nothing unfair or improper in what occurred.

12

Judge Hansen announced a decision at the conclusion of trial. That decision,
however, was not final and was subject to reconsideration Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b);

Ron

Shepherd Ins. Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 n. 4 (Utah 1994). Plaintiff believed the
ruling was incorrect and called the error to the court's attention. This was proper.

Id.

Defendants primary complaint, however, appears to be with what happened thereafter.
Defendants claim repeated instances of the court ruling and plaintiff challenging the ruling.
The fact, however, is that Judge Hansen never clearly ruled on plaintiffs first post-trial, prejudgment motion.
Judge Hansen held a hearing on defendants' motion on April 7, 2004. Although
defendants now claim that Judge Hansen made a ruling following the hearing by signing
defendants' proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, it appears more likely that
Judge Hansen signed the findings by mistake. Judge Hansen had indicated at the hearing that
he was leaning in favor of plaintiff, but the findings signed May 24 adopted defendants'
position without giving any explanation for adopting that position. Judge McVey was
assigned to the case a week after the hearing. It appears likely, therefore, that Judge Hansen
signed the findings as part of an effort to clean up matters that were pending in the cases
assigned to Judge McVey and simply overlooked that each party had submitted proposed
findings and that a ruling was expected to explain why the court was one proposal over the
other.
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In any event, regardless of whether Judge Hansen actually signed the findings by
mistake, it was not inappropriate for plaintiff to believe there was a mistake and to file an
appropriate motion to correct the perceived error, nor was it error for Judge McVey to rule
on the pending motions. Although a transcript of the April 7 hearing does not appear in the
record, Judge McVey stated in his ruling that he "reviewed videotape of the proceedings in
this matter including the bench trial on January 22,2004." (Record 146.) This indicates that
he reviewed more than just the bench trial videotape. Because this Court is required to
assume that the record supports the actions of the trial court unless a transcript shows
otherwise, Albrecht v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 64, % 15, 44 P.3d 838, 842, this Court should
assume that Judge McVey reviewed the tape of the April 7,2004, hearing and concluded that
the May 24 findings were signed in error.
Finally, as stated in Point I of this brief, any procedural error was harmless.
Defendants have not claimed that the judgment ultimately entered was wrong.
This Court should hold that there was no misconduct in plaintiff requesting that the
trial court correct the docket or vacate findings and conclusions entered by inadvertence, nor
any error in the trial court ruling on those motions.

V.

PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEY FEES
ON APPEAL.

Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees below (Record 149 Tf 14; 148 ]f 6.) The award was
based on paragraph 34 of the Office Building Lease (Record 127; Exhibit 1). Although

14

Judge Hansen initially denied an award of attorney fees, Judge McVey corrected that
decision and held the lease terms applied during the holdover period. (Record 52-50, 146145.)
Because plaintiff was awarded attorney fees below, plaintiff is similarly entitled to an
award of attorney fees on appeal. Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates,
617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980).

CONCLUSION
There was no error in the trial court correcting a decision entered by mistake. Because
Judge McVey occupied the same judicial position as Judge Hansen, it was appropriate for
Judge McVey to reconsider and correct legal rulings made by Judge Hansen. The judgment
of the trial court should be affirmed in all respects. Plaintiff should be awarded its attorney
fees incurred on appeal.
DATED this £ ^ d a y of December, 2005.

JACKSON HOWARD and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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